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ABSTRACT 
 
Cooperation between exchange parties becomes a center for inter-organizational relationship. 
Cooperation reduces the attractiveness of opportunistic behavior that seeks short-term benefits, so 
it has been identified as a key factor for inter-organizational cooperation. Although several 
factors affecting cooperative relationship have been studied, the majority of inter-organizational 
studies are conducted on the basis of an individualistic perspective view of Western culture. This 
study introduces group-orientation culture and tries to enhance the understanding the effect of 
group-orientation culture on inter-organizational cooperation in the relationship between 
exchange parties. This study suggests that group-orientation culture influences the generation of 
informal cooperation between exchange parties. When a party expects harmonious relationship 
with its partner, the party develops the relational norm through accepting short-term 
disadvantages that are expected to be balanced out by longer-term advantages. However, 
exchange parties with a low group-orientation culture do not rely on formal cooperation 
mechanisms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ooperation between exchange parties becomes a center for inter-organizational relationship (e.g., 
Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; and Ganesan, 1994). Cooperation reduces 
the attractiveness of opportunistic behavior that seeks short-term benefits, so it has been identified as a 
key factor for inter-organizational cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). A high degree of cooperation is therefore a 
crucial factor for successful inter-organizational relationships (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer, 1995). Thus, 
identifying the causal factor for cooperation could help exchange parties develop mutually beneficial long-term 
relationships with their partners. 
 
Although several factors affecting cooperative relationship have been studied, the majority of inter-
organizational studies are conducted on the basis of an individualistic perspective view of Western culture (Lusch & 
Brown, 1996; and Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995). Thus, few studies have been conducted regarding the 
quality of inter-organizational relationships from the group-oriented perspective associated with Eastern cultures. 
For instance, the influence of culture (i.e., group-orientation culture) on inter-organizational relationship quality has 
been rarely addressed in the relevant literature (Robicheaux & Coleman, 1994). Thus, it is necessary to explore the 
manner in which exchange parties in Eastern culture have been able to improve the quality of their relationships 
with their exchange partners.  
 
Among the cultural dimensions developed by researchers, group-orientation culture has been a key cultural 
dimension that explains social interaction (e.g., Hofstede, 1991, 1980; and Trandis, 1995, and his colleagues, 1990, 
1988). Group-orientation culture is defined as a culture in which a society consists of members who see themselves 
as a part of a group (Triandis, 1995). Hofstede (1991) reported that East-Asian countries, such as Korea, Japan, 
C 
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China, and Taiwan, show high levels of group-orientation culture. Group-orientation culture generates cohesiveness 
among the group members (Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998) and develops a harmonious relationship (Fijneman, 
Willemsen, & Poortinga, 1996; and Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990), whereas individualistic culture pays less 
attention to the relationship and is more task-oriented (Kim, et al, 1994). Thus, group-orientation culture develops a 
favorable condition for nurturing inter-organizational cooperation by forcing exchange parties to seek a cooperative 
relationship and actively solve inter-organizational problems to maintain a harmonious relationship with their 
partners.   
 
The purpose of this study is to enhance the understanding the effect of group-orientation culture on inter-
organizational cooperation in the relationship between exchange parties. The group-orientation culture has been 
replicated at the inter-organizational group level and has been accepted as important for describing the difference 
among companies (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005). Specifically, this study will introduce two types of cooperation - 
formal cooperation and informal cooperation - and investigate how group-orientation culture affects cooperation.   
 
The context of the study is the relationship between a manufacturer and its supplier. In the next section, we 
will provide theoretical backgrounds. We will also provide the dimensions of cooperation that is relevant to channel 
relationships. Finally, hypotheses will be proposed. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS & HYPOTHESES 
 
Group-orientation Culture 
 
To identify the most relevant characteristics of group-orientation culture in the context of inter-
organizational relationships, this study adopts the tacit assumptions of group-orientation culture instead of 
borrowing group-orientation culture directly from cross-cultural studies (e.g., Kim, 2003; and Putnam, 1994). In the 
supply chain context, the level of group-orientation culture is determined by how much priority one exchange party 
puts on its own benefits versus its partners‟ benefits (Kim, 2003). For instance, supply chain members in 
individualist cultures tend to emphasize self-interest and the maximization of individual benefits over exchange 
partner‟s gains (Lawler and Bacharach, 1987). 
 
Group-orientation culture emphasizes members‟ association with a group (Hofstede, 1991). It lays 
emphasis on the obligation toward the group‟s well-being at the expense of individual desires. When there is a 
conflict between individual interests and the group‟s interest, collectivists give priority to the group‟s interest, 
whereas individualists give priority to self-interests (Triandis, 1995). Therefore, group-orientation culture in inter-
organizational relationship connotes an exchange party‟s concern for its exchange partner; it promotes unselfishness 
and places the interest of the group above self-interest (Wagner, 1995; and Kim et al, 1994).  
 
Group-oriented members tend to identify themselves through their group membership, whereas 
individualists define themselves as an autonomous entity independent of a group (Wagner, 1995). Since a group 
strongly influences a group-oriented member‟s identity, group members perceive that they share „common fate‟ 
among themselves (Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990). Thus, in the inter-organizational relationship context, a 
shared fate provides a basis for a very close and intimate relationship between exchange parties. Since exchange 
parties need each other to perform their functions (i.e., a manufacturer needs suppliers of component parts to 
assemble the product), the common fate in group-orientation culture provides them with a solid basis for developing 
a long-term relationship with their partners.  
 
Group-oriented members are sensitive to the ingroup-outgroup boundary (Triandis, 1995). In-group refers 
to a group of individuals with whom the person is willing to cooperate whilst out-group refers to a group of people 
with whom a person has no shared interest (Triandis, 1995). In a country with high group-orientation culture, once a 
party starts doing business with its new partner it implies that the party accepts the new partner within its in-group 
(Griffith, Hu, and Ryans, 2000). Thus, unless a party is prepared to treat its exchange partner as an in-group 
member, the party would not start doing business with that partner.  
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The behaviour of collectivists toward in-group members is different from that exhibited toward out-group 
members (Triandis, McCusker, and Hui, 1990). Group-oriented members tend to recognize an in-group partner‟s 
trustworthiness and maintain cooperative relationships with other in-group partners (Brewer and Kramer, 1985), 
whereas they are likely to have a more superficial relationship with out-group (Kim et al, 1994). Earley (1993) 
reported that the performance of group-oriented members was relatively higher when working with in-group 
partners than with out-group members. Individualists, on the other hand, demonstrated higher performance when 
working alone rather than within an in-group or out-group. 
 
Collectivists apply sanctions against members of an in-group who fail to deliver on their promises to 
exchange partners. Companies in Japan collectively sanction members who fail to deliver the expected level of 
performance. Once the underperforming supplier earns a bad reputation, other members punish the supplier by 
ceasing to transact business with that supplier. Thus, business parties in Japan are pressured to keep promises to 
partners and meet conventional rules. 
 
Cultural Variance within a Culture 
 
The behavior of each member differs, depending on the level of learning or interpretation of the culture 
particular to that person (Keesing, 1974), since culture is learned and interpreted by its members. Therefore, 
depending on a person‟s level of acculturation, various degrees of cultural tendencies may be observed (Wagner, 
1995; and Triandis et al, 1985). As the person accepts and reflects the culture around him/her, so also will exchange 
parties tend to exhibit their culture as they interact in the inter-organizational relationship setting. Since a person 
learns culture as an individual, the focus on culture must be at the individual (unit) level rather than at the national 
level (Goodenough, 1971). 
 
Though the influence of culture per person might be different, there is an overall influence of culture on 
each person (Kim et al, 1994).  The personal difference regarding cultural acceptance does not mean that culture is 
totally reduced to an individual unit level. For instance, in countries with high group-orientation culture, children 
learn to suppress their self-centered tendencies and they receive compliments when they behave according to what 
their group expects (Triandis, 1995). Thus, people under the same culture show similar tendencies among 
themselves than people from different cultures (i.e., on average, group-oriented members show more group-oriented 
tendencies than individualists, whereas individualists reveal a self-centered tendency than collectivists). In sum, 
people show various levels of the dominant culture as individual units due to the difference in adopting the culture, 
but tend to possess the dominant culture than people in other cultures do as a group.  
 
This study takes Keesing‟s (1974) view on culture - the variance of adopting dominant culture among 
individual units. Thus, the diverse level of group-orientation among the exchange parties is adopted as a variable for 
investigating the influence of group-orientation culture on inter-organizational cooperation. 
 
Cooperation 
 
Cooperation is defined as the firms‟ ability to collaborate and work together in a joint fashion toward their 
respective goals (Frazier, 1983). Cooperation is achieved by two types of mechanism - the formal and informal.  
 
Contractual obligations, or rules and regulations, would constitute a formal cooperation mechanism (Smith 
et al, 1995). Contracts refer to the promise between exchange parties to project exchange into the future (Macneil, 
1980). Contract between channel members describes the cooperative behavior with regard to designated tasks or 
periods.  Therefore, each member is constrained to behave cooperatively by some formalized understanding. 
 
Informal cooperation involves relational norms that are based on mutual understanding between channel 
members (Smith et al, 1995). For example, the relationship will be subject to good faith modification by both parties 
if a particular practice proves detrimental to either in the light of changed circumstances (Heide & John, 1992). If a 
vendor cannot meet the deadline for supplying equipment parts, for instance, because of a strike or a flood, the buyer 
is likely to accept the vendor‟s request for delayed delivery as long as the buyer can sustain the shortage of 
equipment. Therefore, relational norms represent an important cooperation mechanism, especially when both 
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exchange partners‟ relationships are long-term oriented (Axelrod, 1984).     
 
Relational norms show two common characteristics. First, relational norms prescribe behavior and regulate 
proper and acceptable behavior of two exchange partners (Macneil, 1980). Second, relational norms vary with 
values relating to collective goals of the two exchange partners and with beliefs about appropriate means for 
attaining these goals (Cartwright and Schwartz, 1973). These characteristics of relational norms indicate that 
relational norms act as a cooperation mechanism between channel members. 
 
Group-orientation culture influences exchange parties to bear long-term perspective in dealing with their 
partners. Group-orientation culture connotes an exchange party‟s concern for its exchange partner - it places the 
interest of the group above self-interest (Wagner, 1995). When organizations try to behave for both parties‟ well-
being, the relationship between exchange parties is likely to be extended for a long time. Thus, they have a good 
chance of developing the relational norm through accepting short-term disadvantages that are expected to be 
balanced out by longer-term advantages (Noordewier John, and Nevin, 1990; and Lusch & Brown, 1996). 
Therefore, firms with high group-orientation culture will gain cooperation through relational norms, a informal 
cooperation. 
 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between informal cooperation and group-orientation culture. 
 
Since members with a low group-orientation culture do not care much about other members, they are less 
likely to have a long-term relationship. Thus, there is low level of long-term perspective among members with a low 
group-orientation culture. There is less degree of relational norms in a low level of long-term perspective because 
relational norms developed through accepting short-term disadvantage that is even out in the long run (Noordewier, 
John, & Nevin, 1990). Instead, formal mechanism, such as a contract, is more prevalent in a low group-orientation 
culture because firms with low levels of group-orientation cannot depend on informal mechanisms to achieve 
cooperation. Therefore, firms with low level of group-orientation depend more on a contract. 
 
Contracts contain the notion of legitimacy which forces exchange parties to observe the terms of the 
contract (Macneil, 1980). Exchange parties with contracts are therefore constrained to behave in certain ways, as 
formalized by the written contract. Thus, hard contracts constitute a formal governance mechanism in the exchange 
relationship (Uzzi, 1999). 
 
Contract means a promise between exchange parties to project exchange into the future (Macneil, 1980). 
Contracts therefore shape relationships in the future, so they would not exist unless some expectation of future 
dealings existed. Since exchange parties cannot predict the future perfectly, the content of contract may not reflect 
the future contingencies well. Either party may be vulnerable to the other if one tries to take advantage of unclear or 
missing contract terms. Thus, when an exchange party tries to take advantage of a formal contract, parties with 
group-orientation culture face difficulty in dealing with this opportunistic partner since confrontation with other 
members is highly undesirable in a group-orientation culture (Triandis et al, 1988). Exchange parties with a high 
level of group-orientation culture therefore prefer not to rely on a contract - a formal cooperation mechanism.  
 
H2:  There is a negative relationship between formal cooperation and group-orientation culture. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Context 
 
To test the hypotheses, we examined the purchasing relationship between manufacturers and their suppliers 
in Korea. We selected Korea for two key reasons. First, Korea is among the highest group-orientation cultures 
(Hofstede, 1991) and second, even though Korea has rapidly developed over the past 30 years, research about inter-
organizational relationships in Korea has been rarely done. Therefore, it is worthwhile to extend our knowledge of 
inter-organizational relationships in Korea.   
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Sample  
 
Included in the sample were 800 manufacturers that belong to SIC codes 3011 to 3999. The sample of 
respondents was drawn from a variety of inter-organizational relationships to enhance the generalizability of the 
results through minimizing the effect of industry-specific characteristics.  
 
Each informant was subsequently mailed a questionnaire and requested to complete it with respect to a 
major supplier. After callbacks and a second mailing, 192 were collected. The response rate is approximately 24%. 
Non-response bias was evaluated by comparing early with late respondents. No significant differences were found 
on the variables “number of employees”, “percentage of purchasing volume” and “years of experience”, which 
suggests that non-response bias may not exist. 
 
Measurement 
 
Group-orientation Culture 
 
Six items were used to measure the group-orientation culture:  1) the prevalence of an„us‟ consciousness, 2) 
the group as a base of identity, 3) emotional dependence on the organization that offers protection in exchange for 
loyalty, 4) taking care of oneself only, 5) tendency of solving problems through groups rather than through 
individual means, and 6) concern about how one‟s country is perceived by other nations. The first four items were 
used by Hofstede (1980) and the fifth and sixth items were adopted by Early (1993) and Triandis, McCusker, and 
Hui (1990) each.  
 
Cooperation 
 
Cooperation type was measured so that formal cooperation and informal cooperation could be 
distinguished. Formal cooperation was characterized by explicit, precise descriptions of each party‟s role, 
responsibilities, legal remedies for performance failures, and the method of conflict resolution. Informal cooperation 
was characterized more by the reliance on mutual understanding (as opposed to contract stipulations) of each party‟s 
role, responsibilities, remedies for performance failures and the way of resolution for conflict.  These items were 
used by Lusch & Brown (1996). 
  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Reliability of independent variables and correlations among them are shown in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively.  In all of the items, exchange parties in Korea show higher cooperation. This is in accordance with 
current literature that Asian countries have more long- term orientation (Hofstede, 1991).  
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 
H1 argues that group-orientation culture affects the buyer‟s use of an informal cooperation mechanism. The 
results in Table 3 indicate that H1 is supported ( = .2207, p  .05).  
 
In contrast, H2 argues that buyers with group-orientation culture are less likely to rely on formal 
cooperation. We thought that existence of an informal cooperation mechanism in the group-orientation culture 
negatively affects the relationship between group-orientation culture and formal cooperation. However, buyers with 
a group-orientation culture have nothing to do with formal cooperation. The results in Table 3 show that H2 is not 
supported.  
 
A control variable of buyer‟s power over supplier did not affect the buyer‟s informal and formal 
cooperation mechanisms at the p-level of .05.  
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Table 1:  Reliability for Independent Variables 
Group-orientation Culture                                                          CR = .71  SFL 
In our society, 
1. It matters to people how our country is perceived by other nations.             
2. “Us” consciousness holds sway. 
3. Each individual is supposed to take care of himself/herself only. 
4. People tend to solve problems through group rather than individual effort 
5. A person‟s identity is based on the group.             
6. People are emotionally dependent on the organization in terms of protection offered in exchange for loyalty. 
 
.71 
* 
* 
.55 
* 
.70 
Formal Cooperation                                                            CR: .82   
1:   mutual understanding of the roles and responsibility   
2:   mutual understanding of the behavior in case of unplanned event 
3:   mutual understanding of how disagreements will be resolved  
.55 
.77 
.53 
Informal Cooperation                                                            CR: .79   
1:   precise definition of roles and responsibility in contract   
2:   detailed direction in contract about behavior for unplanned event 
3:   precise contract statement of how disagreements will be resolved 
.70 
.79 
.68 
2(32) = 41.48 (p=.13), GFI =.93 AGFI = 0.87,  CFI = .95, RMSEA = .054,  
 
 
Table 2:  Correlation Matrix 
 
Group  Informal  Formal 
Group    1.0000 
Informal     .2011  1.0000 
Formal    -.2562    .1925  1.0000 
 
 
Table 3:  Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 
 
                        Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables               Informal              Formal 
 
Group      .2207   .0125  
(2.152)a   (.136) 
Power      -.0121   .0905   
(-.105)   (.702) 
R Square      .0720   .0420  
a : reject Ho at p < .05 (1-tailed test.) 
b : reject Ho at p < .01 (1-tailed test.) 
Power: control variable 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Theoretical Implication 
 
These results indicate that the relationship between exchange parties is significantly affected by the group-
orientation culture. Especially, group-orientation culture positively influences the use of informal cooperation. This 
result implies that it is the group-orientation culture that generates informal cooperation between exchange parties.    
 
Companies with a group-orientation culture expect benefits from a harmonious relationship with their 
exchange parties. When a party expects harmonious relationship with its partner, the party develops the relational 
norm through accepting short-term disadvantages that are expected to be balanced out by longer-term advantages 
(Lusch & Brown, 1996). Thus, they do not risk self interest seeking behavior of their partners. If a party acts for its 
own interest only, they would have to give up benefits from the relationship with its partners. Thus, companies with 
a high group-orientation generate informal cooperation.  
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In contrast, companies with a group-orientation culture do not show any tendency regarding the use of 
formal cooperation. Since exchange parties with a group-orientation culture consider mutual benefit from the 
relationship with their partners, they are least expected to use a formal cooperation mechanism, such as contract. 
However, exchange parties with a group-orientation culture are not associated with the use of formal cooperation. 
  
Managerial Implications  
 
Since many exchange parties operate globally, understanding national culture is important. When a party 
decides to establish a branch in a foreign country, it should adapt management practices to fit the prevailing national 
culture and develop relationship strategies that fit within the host culture. 
 
According to these research findings, group-oriented members appear to rely on informal cooperation in 
relation to their partners. Thus, a group-oriented company bases its interaction with exchange partners on 
harmonious and mutually beneficial relational norms. Thus, companies operating in a group-orientation culture 
should manage their relationships on a long-term basis.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
We examined only one dimension of culture; that is, group-orientation. In particular, the study does not 
include other cultural dimensions, such as a long-term orientation or power distance (Hofstede, 1991). These other 
cultural dimensions could affect the relationship between exchange parties. Therefore, the results obtained from 
cooperation are limited.  
 
Another limitation of the study is the small sample of companies. Though the sample size is usually 
accepted in organization literature, the small sample size affects the stability of the parameter estimates. Therefore, 
the results obtained from the data should be interpreted with caution.  
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